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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the relationship between people and nation by focusing on 
the Greek case, which has attracted considerable political and media attention 
throughout the last few years. It traces the ways in which populism and 
nationalism have been related within Greek political culture diachronically, 
inclusive of the current crisis conjuncture. We follow this trajectory from the 
1940s and the Greek Civil War up until today in order to capture the 
unexpectedly dynamic and ambivalent relationship between the two and account 
for its multiple mutations. The conclusions drawn from this country-specific 
exploration are expected to have wider implications for populism research 
internationally. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore aspects of the relationship between populism and 
nationalism, which are conceived here as distinct types of discourses, as different 
(though not incompatible) ways in which collective identities are constructed and 
enacted. By focusing on this ambiguous and multifaceted relationship, we purport to 
shed light both on theoretical issues regarding these phenomena and on an empirical 
case that we consider particularly important. Indeed, our case, democratic Greece, has 
already been recognised as a “paradigmatic” one by scholars who study populism. 
This is mainly due to the persistent and at times decisive presence of populist actors in 
the Greek political scene. In Takis Pappas’ words, “the Greek case offers near 
laboratory conditions for studying all possible facets and successive phases of 
populist development” (Pappas 2014, 6). 
 
To be sure, populism has been a key-factor in understanding socio-political dynamics 
from the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 onwards, while its presence was 
already felt by the early 1960s. Arguably, a quasi-spontaneous populist dynamic – 
linked to the liberalisation of the life-style of popular strata and an upward mobility 
triggering high expectations – was only temporarily interrupted by the military Junta 
between 1967 and 1974 (Pantazopoulos 2001, 89-133). Henceforth, the populist 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with its charismatic leader, Andreas 
Papandreou, and a loyal and rapidly expanding electoral base, would define political 
confrontation and democratic stakes, both in opposition (1974-1981) and also in 
power (1981-1989) (Lyrintzis 1987; Spourdalakis 1988). PASOK’s populism 
gradually faded after the early 1990s, to give way to a “modernising consensus” 
(Lyrintzis 2005), but new players soon came to the fore. These included Archbishop 
Christodoulos, a rare case of a religious populist leader (Stavrakakis 2004), the 
populist extreme-right party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) (Tsiras 2012), the 
nationalist-populist Independent Greeks (ANEL) (Pappas & Aslanidis 2015, 192-
193), and the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA), the major governing party since 
January 2015 (Katsambekis 2016b). 1  Populism has been a significant force also 
within Greek civil society and social movements. The most important recent such 
example is the one of the “aganaktismenoi” (or “movement of the squares”), which 
erupted in the summer of 2011, following similar mobilisations in Spain 
(Katsambekis 2014a; Prentoulis & Thomassen 2014). 
 
In this context, it does not come as a surprise that populism has been one of the key 
themes that preoccupied Greece’s social-scientific community already from the late 
1970s and 1980s, with numerous articles and books being published and relevant 
conferences and public discussions being organized in university departments and 
                                                        
1 We do not consider the Golden Dawn as a “populist” party, despite the fact that it is occasionally 
discussed as one. This is due to the party’s fundamentally anti-democratic positioning and its extremist 
para-military character and neo-Nazi ideology that define its discourse and strategy (see also Pappas 
2014, 106; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, 135). 
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other fora (Mouzelis 1978, 1985; Lyrintzis 1987; Mouzelis, Lipowatz & Spourdalakis 
1989; Charalambis 1989; Elefantis 1992; Spourdalakis & Lyrintzis 1993). One of the 
most prominent themes that developed within Greek populism research out of 
PASOK’s hegemony, was that of its so-called national-populism or nationalist 
populism, especially developed by Andreas Pantazopoulos (2001). Drawing his 
theoretical inspiration from the French political philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff, 
Pantazopoulos has at times suggested that (all) populism can only be national-
populism, which means that populism cannot exist without a close linkage or even 
identification with some kind of nationalism.  
 
Pantazopoulos first applied this perspective to Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK and 
then to the case of SYRIZA (Pantazopoulos 2001; 2011; 2013; 2016c). Similar 
arguments had been advanced by other Greek scholars, like Nikiforos Diamandouros, 
who saw populism – irrespective of its left-right placement – as a defining 
characteristic of the so-called “underdog culture”, which was rooted in backward-
oriented and defensive reactions against progress, in nationalism and anti-Westernism 
(Diamandouros 1994). Quite interestingly, within the recent years of crisis and 
austerity the discussion around national-populism [εθνικολαϊκισμός] has left the 
academic sphere to acquire a prominent position in op-eds and commentaries in 
newspapers, while it has also been appropriated by a series of mainstream politicians 
in their effort to smear political opponents as “populist” and “nationalist”. 
 
Given its populist tradition(s) and the relevant debates generated – in which nation 
and people are often intertwined – we believe that the study of the Greek case can add 
important insights and findings to the broader international discussion around the 
relationship between populism and nationalism, which has only recently started to 
develop as a distinct research agenda (see De Cleen 2016). In what follows, we start 
with a brief overview of the discussion, theorising the main concepts that we use in 
our analysis: how has populism been related to nationalism? Is it possible to 
conceptually distinguish the one from the other and how? We then move on to 
investigate genealogically the particularities of the Greek case starting from the post-
WWII situation and concluding with the current SYRIZA-ANEL coalition. How has 
the “nation” been related to “the people” in Greece’s historical trajectory? What could 
be the theoretical implications of the different articulations observed? 
 
Concluding this paper, we critically reflect on the historical experience of the 
articulation(s) of populism and nationalism in the Greek case, stressing their 
heterogeneity and variability, as well as the implications they might have for the 
investigation of relationships between populism and nationalism in broader contexts.  
 
Populism and nationalism 
A cursory glance at the existing literature on populism would suffice for anyone to 
realise that populism has often been linked to nationalism in various historical 
instances (Ionescu & Gellner 1969; Meny & Surel 2002; Panizza 2005; Mudde & 
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Kaltwasser 2012; de la Torre 2015). The populist leaders of Latin America in the 
1940s and 1950s had strong nationalist characteristics, while the same applies to some 
among the more recent populists of the so-called “pink tide”, like Hugo Chávez, who 
are positioned on the left, but developed distinctive nationalist narratives (Philip & 
Panizza 2011; Stavrakakis et al. 2016). Europe’s populist extreme-right trend after the 
late 1980s is also inconceivable without its pronounced nationalist/nativist ideological 
traits (Mudde 2007). Lastly, even parties considered to belong to the contemporary 
European left have drawn on nationalist narratives; maybe the most typical example 
here is the Irish Sin Fein (March 2011, 122). In this context, it should not come as a 
surprise that already from the late-1960s scholars have hypothesised that populism 
and nationalism are somehow necessarily related (e.g. Stewart 1969, 183). 
  
Highlighting such historical links between populism and nationalism is a rather easy 
task. What is crucial for political research is to determine what exactly these links 
mean. Do they mean that populism is necessarily linked and even reduced to 
nationalism, or is one dealing with a contingent, context-dependent articulation 
between the two? Obviously, the fact that populism as a notion appears particularly 
vague and malleable, does not make things easier. Moreover, nationalism itself, albeit 
constituting one of the richest research topics in the social sciences, remains quite 
vague and contested as well (especially when we start discussing variations of 
nationalism: ethnic, civic, etc.). To be sure, not all populisms are the same, nor do 
they produce the same results; notice, for example, the recent distinction between 
inclusionary and exclusionary populism(s) (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). The same 
applies to nationalism(s); the operation of the “nation” in anti-colonialism, for 
example, is not identical with its far right articulations. Nevertheless, in addition to a 
priori attributing some sort of necessity to an “essential” linkage between populism 
and nationalism, some scholars also seem to take for granted a “universal” meaning of 
nationalism, premised on normative assumptions that regard it as necessarily 
dangerous, regressive and antidemocratic (e.g. Pantazopoulos 2016a; 2016b; Taggart 
2000, 96-97; Lukacs 2005, 65-66, 72). As a result of the assumed reductionist 
relationship between populism and nationalism, the normative rejection of national 
identification also leads to an unconditional rejection of populism as well. 
 
How can one avoid such a normative bias that could forestall a rigorous discussion of 
the issues in question? First, we need to stress that we understand both populism and 
nationalism as types of discourse. As particular ways of understanding and 
interpreting social reality and political stakes by interpellating social subjects and 
calling them to take action – whether that means calling the “people” to tear down an 
unpopular “establishment” and implement their democratic will, or calling upon the 
“nation” to defend the homeland against external and/or internal enemies. We do not 
claim that this is the only way to conceive these two notions. However, by associating 
this research with the broad and well-tested field of discourse analysis, as exemplified 
by the so-called “Essex School”, we can make use of the fruitful methodological, 
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theoretical and analytical insights produced by discourse theorists researching both 
populism and (admittedly less) nationalism (see Panizza 2005; Norval 1996). 
 
In this context, and following the work of discourse-oriented scholars (Laclau 2005; 
Stavrakakis 2004; Panizza 2005), we define populism as a particular type of discourse 
which adopts a central reference to “the people” (or other equivalent signifiers: the 
“non-privileged”, the “underdog”, etc.) against a perceived power bloc, usually 
denounced as “the establishment” or “the elite”. The particularity of populism lies in 
the fact that it creates equivalential links between subjects and demands drawing on 
their common grievances and frustrations, while channelling those feelings against a 
common political opponent (Katsambekis 2016c).2 
 
Just as populism performatively ascribes to “the people” a protagonist position, 
making it the nodal point of its strategy, the primary function of nationalist discourse 
is to construct the “nation” (Sutherland 2005, 186). This process is closely articulated 
with claims to defend its territory, sovereignty, interests, history and heritage, against 
anyone that threatens it. Thus, the crucial difference with populism does not only lie 
in the fact that the two discourses interpellate distinct (although historically closely 
related) collective subjects, but also in the fact that the very operation of constructing 
them follows different logics. While populism refers to an antagonism between “the 
people” as a potential social majority against an unresponsive or threatening elite at 
the top of socio-political hierarchy, nationalism refers to the “nation” as an (imagined) 
community of belonging and shared fate, opposed to external or internal enemies that 
threaten its unity, integrity and well-being (Anderson 2006). It is in this sense that 
researchers have formulated a useful distinction between the down/up antagonistic 
logic of populism and the in/out (member/non-member) opposition of nationalism 
(De Cleen 2016, 72-73; Dyrberg 2003). Lastly, it is crucial to stress that the “nation” 
of nationalist discourse is constructed by asserting its difference (or enmity) towards 
other nations; by contrast, “the people” of populism is always constructed through its 
opposition to a given “establishment” or “elite”, and not against other “people”. 
 
Although our theoretical argument here is necessarily brief, we think it suffices to 
make it clear that populism and nationalism constitute different discursive modes of 
constructing collective subjects/identities, and they thus denote different analytical 
categories. Although historical articulations between them exist and have been 
documented in the literature, we should be careful not to conflate the two notions or 
to collapse one onto the other. Such a gesture would undermine the theoretical status 
and explanatory value of the concepts of both populism and nationalism, thus 
rendering impossible a rigorous account of the existing articulations of the 
phenomena to which they allude. Following the tradition of discourse theory, we 
suggest that it is through tracing the historical conditions of possibility behind 
                                                        
2 This is a brief definition of populism and we necessarily leave outside crucial aspects of it. For further 
theoretical clarifications see the article by De Cleen and Stavrakakis in the current special issue. 
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hegemonic discourses within broader socio-political contexts, that we can further 
illuminate the specificity and importance of ideological phenomena. Let us then move 
on to examine these articulations in the Greek case. 
 
Post-war Greece: the “nation” vs. “the people”? 
It is rather risky to suggest that post-war Greece (1945-1967) witnessed populist 
phenomena. The relevant research has very rarely used the term “populism” to 
explain aspects of Greece’s social and political life during the period in question 
(Papadimitriou 2006). One thing seems to be certain, though: the Greece that rose 
from the ashes of WWII (1940-1945) and the Greek Civil War (1945-1949), was a 
country defined by a rather peculiar yet extremely revealing juxtaposition. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, the official discourse of the ruling (right-wing) camp 
seemed to juxtapose the “nation” to “the people”. 
 
This dominant discourse was built around the ideology of ethnikofrosini (national-
mindedness), a state-ideology that primarily targeted the defeated left-wing camp. To 
be sure, Greece was far from exceptional in articulating such a state ideology. 
Ethnikofrosini was an expression of post-war anticommunism “as it developed in the 
USA and Western Europe; therefore, it was shaped by both national and transnational 
currents. In this respect, anti-communism was articulated with Greek nationalism” 
(Lialiouti 2015, 4). Leftists were thus considered second-order citizens, largely 
excluded from the national community, portrayed as “enemies of the nation”, “Slavs”, 
“traitors,” or common “bandits”, suspected of undermining national institutions like 
family and religion, threatening social order or even the very territorial integrity of the 
country (Voglis 2002; Panourgia 2009; Papadimitriou 2006). The “winners” of the 
Civil War claimed an absolute monopoly on the nation and thus demanded from those 
they considered “suspicious” to publicly declare their compliance with the same 
values and ideology as theirs, denouncing communism and the Left. Otherwise, they 
were considered as aliens to be eradicated, as “enemies within”. In practice, the 
“monopoly of the nation” was translated into policies that had a very tangible impact 
on the lives of those persecuted. As stressed by Polymeris Voglis, during the Civil 
War, political repression against leftists culminated in political exclusion: 
“individuals were deprived of their civil rights because of their political beliefs, [...] 
leftists, and even their relatives, were deported or imprisoned, were fired from their 
jobs, had their property confiscated, or were deprived of their Greek nationality,” in 
what was presented by the state as a campaign defending the nation (Voglis 2002, 63-
64). Part of this campaign, which continued after the end of the civil war, was also the 
so-called “rehabilitation” of communists in camps like the ones of Makronisos, where 
alleged leftists (“misguided communists”) were severely tortured until considered “re-
doctrinated patriots” (ibid., 100-105). 
 
On the other side, those participating in the resistance during the axis occupation 
through the ranks of the National Liberation Front (EAM) (which was affiliated to the 
Communist Party, KKE), had formulated their claim to the national community in 
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terms of laocratia (rule by the people), emphasizing forms of self-rule and collective 
life that went beyond the Marxist-Leninist tradition, reflecting a Popular Front 
orientation as expressed in the 7th Congress of the Communist International (see Eley 
2002, 264-265). It was through the “people’s kratos”, the power of workers and 
peasants, that a “new Greece” would be born, with the popular masses now free from 
economic and political oppression (Skalidakis 2014). As formulated in 1943, 
laocratia “was the power of the working people”, that would resolve “the vital 
problems of the country according to the interest of the people”. “The people”, within 
this context, were described as a broad and pluralist coalition, one of “workers, 
peasants, manufacturers, private entrepreneurs, public servants, intelligentsia, 
soldiers, youth, national minorities”, comprising a national majority that recognized 
“only one enemy, the reactionary oppressing big bourgeoisie” (ibid.). In this way, 
EAM’s discourse embraced all anti-fascist and progressive elements of the Greek 
society, calling upon the people to join the fight for national liberation. But the 
nationalism it articulated was of a political kind (predominantly civic, not ethnic), one 
that stressed popular/political participation and anti-fascist struggle and did not 
endorse exclusions in terms of ethnic belonging (see Dimitriou 2014).  
 
The resulting divide involved a paradoxical tension between the “nation” and “the 
people”, nationalism and populism. If, on the one hand, the right-wing state 
established after the civil war was an exclusionary “a-popular” state, a nation 
“without a people” (Elefantis 1992; also Stavrakakis 2005, 246), oppositional forces 
demanded re-incorporation in an inclusionary political community envisaged along 
rather populist lines. The situation became more contentious in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, as Greece entered a turbulent period characterized by emergent social 
movements, a youth uprising and civil society initiatives. Now, broad social strata 
started to gradually claim the expansion of social and political rights, the 
democratization of the political system, as well as a more progressive life-style 
(Nikolakopoulos 2001; Kornetis 2013). Processes within society were soon reflected 
on the political level with the rise of more progressive political forces. In 1958, EDA 
(Unified Democratic Left) became the main opposition party (Clogg 1987, 38), while 
after 1961 the Centre Union (which, despite its anti-communist character, included a 
progressive faction) gained momentum and soon rose to power. This was the political 
environment in which Andreas Papandreou took his first steps and made his presence 
felt for the first time (ibid., 40-49). It was also the environment in which social 
mobilisations indicated a “marching” of the popular masses into the political scene, 
something that presented a serious challenge to the regime of ethnikofrosini and the 
right’s exclusionary monopoly to the nation. This dynamic was violently interrupted 
by the imposition of the Colonels’ regime in 1967, but it resumed with renewed force 
right after the Junta fell in 1974. 
 
Greece after the Junta: consolidating democracy, glorifying “the people” 
The military Junta fell in July 1974 and Greece was set on track to restore democracy. 
At first, the paternalistic figure of Konstantinos Karamanlis, a right-wing conservative 
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politician, managed to secure for his newly established party, New Democracy, two 
undisrupted terms in power (1974-1981). His narrative was one of stability, 
reconciliation and national unity, paving the way towards EEC accession, and 
managed to attract the majority of Greek voters (Pappas 2014, 15-16). Karamanlis 
tried to overcome the deep wounds caused by the civil war and by the very regime of 
ethnikofrosini (in which he had played a key-role in the 1950s and 1960s as Prime 
Minister) by abandoning the right’s passionate anti-communism, adopting more 
progressive socio-economic policies and trying to include all Greek citizens in his 
narrative, regardless of political persuasions (Lyrintzis 1984, 106). In this effort, he 
often stressed that his party “identifies the people with the nation”, as well as 
“national sovereignty with popular sovereignty”, quoting the founding declaration of 
his newly established party (ND 1974). As Efthimis Papavlasopoulos notes, “the 
nation” along with “national interest” constituted the very core of the official ideology 
of the conservative party, as historically expressed by Karamanlis and ND 
(Papavlasopoulos 2004, 5). 
 
Even though Karamanlis managed to restore fundamental freedoms and political 
rights, securing a peaceful transition to liberal democracy, there was still a big part of 
the population that never felt properly represented and incorporated. This is the gap 
that Andreas Papandreou and his party came to fill. PASOK’s archetypal populism, 
put forward the demands of the so-called “non-privileged” for social justice, popular 
sovereignty and national independence against an “establishment” accused of 
monopolising political access and economic privilege in various ways since the end of 
the civil war. In this way, it effectively addressed the side that was defeated in the 
civil war, and thus those excluded from the national and political community in the 
decades that followed, promising not only their reincorporation into its ranks, but also 
their recognition as the “true protagonists”, as “true patriots”. In this context, Christos 
Lyrintzis has stressed that a “major achievement of the PASOK governments of the 
1981-1989 period was the empowerment of social groups that had never enjoyed any 
significant share of power” (Lyrintzis 2005, 149). Indeed, PASOK “adopted and 
implemented a ‘populist mode of political incorporation’, whose main goal was the 
incorporation into the political system of social strata excluded from it by previous 
right-wing governments” (Lyrintzis 1993, 30). Diamandouros, a strong critic of 
PASOK’s populist legacy, also speaks about the 1974-1985 period in terms of an 
“incorporative moment”, in which PASOK’s role both in opposition and in power was 
crucial (Diamandouros 1993, 8, 10-12). 
 
But the early PASOK was not only about political incorporation, symbolic 
recognition and representation of the previously excluded. The party’s record in 
power was marked by myriads of pathologies, such as rampant clientelism, 
corruption, economic policies based on increased borrowing, public administration 
practices that led to a rather “chaotic” expansion of the state, along with nationalist 
tendencies (Lyrintzis 1993; Diamandouros 1993). To be sure, during the 1970s and 
1980s, PASOK was a multifaceted, complex and often paradoxical phenomenon. 
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Within the scope of our analysis, what is crucial to revisit is what PASOK’s populism 
“actually” did regarding the construction and representation of the Greek people. Did 
it play a key role in identifying the Greek people with the Greek nation in terms that 
one would be entitled to recognise its ideology as primarily national-populist? Was it 
nationalist in a more pronounced and salient way when compared to its political 
rivals? 
 
In order to answer this question we need to adopt a macro-historical view and remind 
ourselves, once more, that a significant part of the Greek society was deprived by the 
post-war regime of ethnikofrosini of the very right to belong to the nation. In this 
sense, restoring the people as rightful co-participants within the national community 
seems more of an act of symbolic recognition, an act of egalitarian incorporation,3 
than the culmination of an ethno-nationalist project. This becomes even more evident 
if one takes a comparative look and contrasts PASOK to its political rivals of that 
time. In doing so, one soon realises that the main party of the right, ND, had adopted 
all along a discourse that strongly emphasised the party’s commitment to the nation, 
something which was also evident in the discourse of other parties, even that of the 
communist left (KKE). In this sense, relating the people to the nation was hardly a 
distinctive characteristic that set PASOK apart from other parties; hence it cannot 
qualify as the defining/distinctive trait in assessing its profile. It was a populist 
politics of inclusion and incorporation that predominantly defined PASOK’s 
discursive strategy during the 1970s and 1980s, something which was also crucial for 
its ascendance to power; and here a re-appropriation of national membership from 
right-wing elites obviously had a prominent, yet overdetermined, place. 
 
At any rate, it would be equally wrong to claim that the PASOK of that period was 
anti-nationalist or non-nationalist. What is crucial is to recognise the context-related 
characteristics as well as the historical pre-conditions of possibility for the specific 
brand of nationalism that the early PASOK indeed expressed. One that responded to 
decades of Greece’s dependence on foreign powers, one that reacted to the right-wing 
camp’s long suppression of the left and progressive forces, one that was closely 
related to the Greek left’s traditional anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, but also 
to a historically-specific kind of ‘decolonisation’ discourse. 
 
PASOK’s populism started to fade as soon as Papandreou himself started to withdraw 
in the early 1990s. The party thus took a different path from the mid-1990s onwards, 
under the leadership of Costas Simitis, a mild-mannered technocrat and vocal 
opponent of populism, nationalism and clientelism, who developed a public profile 
close to the paradigm of the Blairite ‘third way’ (Lyrintzis 2005). His sharp anti-
populism, gaining prominence already by the early 1990s, meant a major 
                                                        
3  An incorporation that had tangible effects as well, as PASOK recognised war-time resistance 
organisations of the left and granted to thousands of peoples that had fled to the Eastern bloc the right 
to repatriate. 
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transformation in PASOK’s discourse, and created an environment conducive to the 
rise of new populist actors (see Pantazopoulos 2011, 149-185). 
 
The diversification of the field: Religious and extreme-right populists after 2000 
Right before the dawn of the 21st century, Greece seemed to have left behind the days 
of populist hegemony. Now, economic and technical issues regarding the Economic 
and Monetary Union dominated the agenda, with Simitis’ government adopting a 
forward-looking narrative stressing the new strengths of the Greek economy, its 
privileged position at the core of the EU and the benefits that would soon accrue from 
its participation in the Eurozone. “Consensus” became a buzzword among most 
mainstream politicians, stressing the need to converge on a series of key-policy issues 
(Katsambekis 2016a, 151). With mainstream parties struggling to differentiate one’s 
programme from the other’s, populist challengers soon rose from rather unexpected 
places. 
 
The case of Archbishop Christodoulos is quite important here. In 2000, the Simitis 
government decision to delete reference to religion from Greek identity cards 
triggered an unprecedented response on behalf of the Church of Greece. The then 
newly elected Archbishop Christodoulos led a campaign to oppose this decision, 
articulating a discourse that was marked by a sharply populist profile. This campaign 
included mass rallies in the two biggest cities of Greece, Thessaloniki and Athens, 
attended by hundreds of thousands of people. This phase of populist mobilization 
ended rather abruptly in September 2001 after the Church’s demand for a referendum 
was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and dismissed by the 
President of the Republic, Costis Stephanopoulos. At any rate, detailed discourse-
analytical research has shown that the articulation of Church discourse during that 
period gave a prominent place to “the people”, which functioned as its nodal point. In 
addition, it was clearly organized according to an antagonistic logic, distinguishing 
between “us”, the forces of Good (the People as represented by the Church under 
God) and “them”, the forces of Evil (an atheist, modernizing, intellectualist and 
repressive government) (Stavrakakis 2004; 2005). To be sure, “the people” of 
Christodoulos were not just the orthodox Christian people, but clearly the Greek 
people, as he presented in his discourse a quasi-primordial link between the Greek 
nation, Orthodoxy and “the people of the church”. In this sense, the nationalism 
expressed by Christodoulos was of a rather traditional kind: “Inside us there is a 
whole treasure, an unspent richness that has not been distorted up to now, that unites 
all our race [genos]” (Christodoulos, quoted in Stavrakakis 2005, 244).  
 
This kind of nationalism is a constant in the Greek Church’s discourse, which has 
often claimed historical, quasi-metaphysical links with the Greek nation (Chrysoloras 
2004). But if a deeply rooted nationalism is a core characteristic of the Greek 
Church’s profile, the same cannot be argued with regard to populism. Before the 
identity cards crisis “the people” were not assigned any privileged position in 
archbishop Christodoulos’ discourse or in that of his predecessors (Stavrakakis 2004, 
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260). Likewise, more recently, important Church figures have adopted “anti-populist” 
positions, siding with the “Yes” in the July 2015 referendum. In other words, 
although nationalism is a constitutive characteristic of the hierarchy of the Church of 
Greece, evident from its foundation, its articulation with other themes (populist or 
anti-populist) is a matter of contingency, following from the various orientations that 
the leadership chooses from time to time (Papastahis 2009). The articulation of the 
two in Christodoulos’s project seems thus more of a strategic choice than an outcome 
of any pre-existing necessity. 
 
The second major nationalist-populist incident of that period came a few months after 
the dust had settled from Christodoulos’ mobilizations and was associated with the 
then newly formed party: National Orthodox Rally (LAOS). LAOS emerged in 2000, 
founded by Giorgos Karatzaferis, an ousted ND MP, and entered European 
Parliament in 2004 and national parliament in 2007. Ideologically similar to other 
European populist extreme-right forces such as the Front National in France, it saw its 
electoral support significantly rise from the early 2000s onwards, to violently collapse 
right after it supported a technocratic coalition government in 2011, along with 
PASOK and ND.  
 
No doubt, the signifier “the people” constituted a central reference in LAOS’s 
discourse. In fact, the party’s acronym, LAOS [λαός] means “the people” in Greek. Its 
discourse was also premised on a sharply antagonistic view of society. In this context, 
the relevant literature immediately categorized LAOS as a populist party belonging to 
the populist radical right party family (Tsiras 2012). Crucially, “the people” of LAOS 
were identified with the Greek nation and with Orthodoxy (the very name of the party 
stressing the popular and the orthodox). A cursory glance at Karatzaferis’ discourse 
suffices to establish that Greek “people” and “nation” are understood as inseparable; 
with the latter being defined in terms of historical, territorial and even racial 
continuity: “all of you […] constitute the core of the Nation, the heart of Greece” 
(Karatzaferis 2001). As the main enemy of this Greek people-as-nation, Karatzaferis 
pitted the “rotten establishment” of PASOK and ND, the so-called “New world 
Order”, but also the abstract figure of the “illegal immigrant”, that “invades” Greece, 
occupying job positions that were intended for the natives, threatening the Greek 
people’s security and well-being, “contaminating” the country’s ancient and “pure” 
culture (Tsiras 2012). In this context, LAOS’ discourse was firstly built around an 
in/out logic, calling upon those that were considered members of the ethno-national 
community to act against those outside. Only secondarily did LAOS’ discourse draw 
upon down/up logics, targeting the “establishment” which yet again was threatening 
those in by favouring those out (from “illegal immigrants” to “US sovereignty”). 
Hence, for Karatzaferis, the task of the people was to protect and guarantee the future 
and integrity of the nation: “Our own people guarantee the Future of the NATION. 
[…] We are called upon to protect the NATION. To fight for the Homeland. […] The 
Popular Orthodox Rally does not invest on chimeras, it does not dispose sovereignty 
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rights to foreign patrons or local dependants. [LAOS] addresses the People and draws 
power from the People” (Karatzaferis 2006; capitals in the original). 
 
LAOS adopted a vocal office-seeking strategy right after the outbreak of the debt 
crisis that hit Greece in 2009-2010, claiming that it would act as a “responsible 
partner” within the political scene, facilitating cross-party collaboration and alliances 
in times crucial for the country’s survival, even stressing the bonds of LAOS with 
ND, in the context of a right-wing “family tree” [δεξιά πολυκατοικία]. This strategy, 
combined with a significant transformation of the party’s discourse towards a less 
populist logic, paid off and LAOS was soon accepted by the traditional (now anti-
populist) parties, PASOK and ND, as a “responsible ally”. Gradually shedding its 
populism, LAOS emphasized in its 2012 manifesto that it defined itself as a 
“genuinely patriotic”, “Greek-centred” and “originally popular” party with a 
“movement character”, stressing that it is “popular […] without being populist” 
(LAOS 2012, 4). 
 
Still, LAOS maintained a strong nationalist ideology, combined with conspiracy-
theory elements, xenophobia and a sharp anti-left/anti-communist orientation, 
targeted against SYRIZA’s emerging dynamic. This turn of events indicates that it is 
nationalism/nativism4 that one should identify as the core ideological characteristic of 
LAOS, the key to understanding its physiognomy, and not its populism. This brings 
us back to Cas Mudde’s crucial but not often recalled thesis on Europe’s populist 
radical right: ‘nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of 
this party family’ (Mudde 2007, 26). 
 
The rise of the populist left and its cohabitation with the populist right in crisis-
ridden Greece 
Shifting our focus to the other side of the political spectrum, one is immediately 
confronted with the emergence of the populist radical left within the context of the 
crisis that hit Greece after 2009 (Katsambekis 2016b). SYRIZA, a coalition-turned-
party, addressed and eventually managed to mobilise “the people” with a discourse 
that articulated various popular demands and grievances against the Greek and 
European “elites” and their policies of austerity along the lines of an “Us” vs. “Them” 
schema (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014). Its rise to prominence established a new 
polarisation within the Greek political system between the pro-austerity/pro-
memorandum political forces (represented by PASOK and ND) and the anti-
austerity/anti-memorandum forces (represented by SYRIZA). This polarisation was 
signified by political and media elites in terms of a struggle between “anti-populist 
rationalism” versus “irrational populism” (Stavrakakis 2014), thus incorporating the 
rise of SYRIZA within the predominantly anti-populist narrative that had been 
                                                        
4 LAOS’s nationalism soon met with that of the main party of the centre-right in Greece, Antonis 
Samaras’ ND, which absorbed LAOS’ most prominent figures in 2012, effectively neutralising it, 
making it a redundant political force. 
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hegemonic within the Greek public sphere from the mid-1990s onwards (Katsambekis 
2014b, 562-565). 
 
SYRIZA was the only parliamentary party that engaged with the demands of the anti-
austerity movements and protests that made their presence felt throughout 2010-2011. 
The party tried to represent the marginalised and disenfranchised social strata in its 
discourse, constructing and performing its own version of the “crisis”, attributing the 
blame to the old “two-party establishment” (PASOK/ND) and to the neoliberal 
policies imposed by the EU and IMF. Its programme aimed at a radical break with 
austerity and neoliberalism, stressing political renewal and democratic reinvigoration, 
while aiming at a radical redistribution of wealth. As shown in earlier research 
(Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; Katsambekis 2016b), SYRIZA’s populism was of 
a very distinctive blend, one close to the ideal-type of left-wing populism as described 
by Luke March. The latter has stressed that left-wing populism “emphasizes 
egalitarianism and inclusivity rather than the openly exclusivist anti-immigrant or 
anti-foreigner concerns of right-populism” (March 2011, 122). Indeed, SYRIZA’s 
discourse endorsed pro-immigrant and pro-rights demands, which emphasised 
tolerance within a pluralist society and hence an effort to incorporate various 
minorities within “the people”. Moreover, the party’s discourse has been 
diachronically marked by strong anti-nationalist ideological elements, which were 
toned-down only as the party was approaching power and thus needed to address the 
national audience in more universal, ‘banal nationalist’ terms (as it is the case with 
most parties that ascend to power). In effect, SYRIZA developed its own blend of 
“anti-colonial” patriotism as it was approaching power, often stressing the “pride” and 
“dignity” of the impoverished Greek people, as opposed to oppressing power-elites 
within and outside the debt-ridden country. 
 
In January 2015, SYRIZA won a general election and formed a coalition government 
with ANEL, a nationalist-populist party that built its strategy on a strong anti-austerity 
discourse. ANEL’s ideological roots can be found in what in Greece is called the 
“popular right”, which was traditionally part of ND and had articulated in its 
discourse elements of Keynesianism and state-interventionism, along with 
nationalism and a commitment to religion. ANEL were created by a former MP of 
ND, Panos Kammenos, in 2012, and they achieved impressive results in the elections 
of May and June 2012, running on an anti-austerity ticket, while attacking the “troika” 
and its party collaborators in Greece (ND/PASOK), which they depicted as “traitors” 
or even “conspirators” against the homeland. In this sense ANEL can be safely 
identified as a right-wing nationalist party, with their discourse sometimes containing 
xenophobic, racist and conspiracy-mongering elements. 
 
SYRIZA’s co-existence with ANEL has been uneasy, but remarkably stable. The two 
parties seem to agree on the management of state finances and public administration, 
while occasionally disagreeing on issues that have to do with immigration, the rights 
agenda, religion and culture. What seems to have brought the two parties together was 
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their common anti-memorandum and anti-austerity position, as well as their 
populism: a dichotomic political perspective pitting “the people” against the “elites” 
(local and global). Otherwise, the two parties have preserved their sharply distinctive 
characters, made evident in their public discourses but also in concrete policy choices. 
They thus provide a crucial example of how populism can operate as a formal 
orientation allowing different ideological articulations. Crucially, these articulations 
can range from nativism and nationalism (in the case of ANEL) to positions 
negotiating tolerance within an inclusionary and multicultural society (in the case of 
SYRIZA). 
 
Overall, their differentiations and divergences have come about on issues of 
ideological disagreement on the left/right or progressive/conservative axis. First, 
SYRIZA proposed a law in June 2015 to grant full citizenship rights to the majority of 
second generation immigrants and especially immigrant children. The bill was voted 
down by ANEL, but passed with the support of parties of the liberal centre and the 
centre-left, Potami and PASOK. The same happened with the new legal framework 
concerning same-sex civil unions passed by the Greek Parliament in December 2015: 
once more, the law was voted down by ANEL and passed with votes from Potami, 
PASOK and Union of Centrists. The distance was reaffirmed with regard to the 
building of a Mosque in central Athens as well as on other occasions. These 
paradigmatic instances show that while there are crucial strategic and programmatic 
elements that hold the two parties together in a power-sharing arrangement, they 
remain far apart in terms of ideology and especially regarding the conception of the 
nation and that of a tolerant and pluralist society. Accordingly, their populisms 
develop along different patterns.  
 
The sharp ideological differences among them are evident not only on the discursive 
level and on aspects of their policy agenda, but have also been measured in 
quantitative terms, on the level of attitudes. A recent study (Stavrakakis, Andreadis & 
Katsambekis 2016) has used a reformulated populism index to conduct a candidate 
survey in order to identify populist parties in Greece. Findings have shown that 
ANEL and SYRIZA are clearly distinguished from other non-populist or anti-populist 
parties (PASOK, ND and Potami). Yet, what this study further established was the 
clear ideological division within the populist camp itself, between ANEL and 
SYRIZA, illustrating that one can observe crucially different attitudes between the 
two parties along the Green-Alternative-Libertarian / Traditional-Authoritarian-
Nationalist (GAL/TAN) dimension (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002). The scores of 
SYRIZA and ANEL candidates on the GAL vs. TAN index were 1.9 and 3.4 
respectively, providing additional support to the hypothesis that right-wing populism 
is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusionary 
and pluralist” (Stavrakakis, Andreadis & Katsambekis 2016, 12-13). These 
differences become even more apparent when we focus on specific issues, like 
immigration. In this case, we find SYRIZA candidates on the one side of the 
spectrum, showing the most tolerant and pro-immigration stance among Greek 
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political parties, while ANEL candidates occupy the exact opposite position. 5 
Crucially, the “degrees” of nationalism as measured in candidates’ responses perfectly 
follow the positioning of each party on the left-right axis, illustrating that there is no 
automatic relationship between populist and nationalist attitudes in this particular 
case.  
 
The latest development within (and beyond) Greece’s populist politics concerns a 
transnational initiative that still seems to be in the making: Yanis Varoufakis’ 
DiEM25. DiEM25 came into being after Varoufakis left SYRIZA following the July 
2015 referendum, after SYRIZA’s populist strategy to counter neoliberal austerity 
reached a crucial limit. Given that Varoufakis had been a very active figure during 
SYRIZA’s first term in office, we feel intrigued to ask: could it be that the failure to 
have a successful (progressive) populism in government, in one country, led to the 
endeavour for a pan-European transnational populist movement? If that is the case, 
then with Varoufakis’ initiative a circle seems to be closing. Greece’s post-war 
political scene was defined by a paradoxical distancing between “nation” and 
“people”, by the opposition between ethnikofrosini (national-mindedness) and 
laocratia (people-power); today this distancing may be re-emerging to the extent that 
people like Varoufakis come to the conclusion that a defence of popular interests can 
be effectively pursued only if social/political action at the national level is closely 
articulated with a transnational project, thus taking populism beyond the national 
level in a more pronounced way (see Panayotou 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
Populism is a truly ambiguous phenomenon, able to manifest within extremely 
different ideological and socio-political contexts. In this sense, one should be very 
careful when formulating reductive definitions or when putting forward normative 
assumptions. The historico-conceptual and comparative exercise that we attempted 
here was premised on the intension to highlight the contradictions that may occur 
when adopting reductionist and/or essentialist approaches regarding populist politics. 
Such approaches often seem to ignore the historicity and inherent plasticity of the 
phenomenon in its global scale, reducing, for example, populism to nationalism 
(Pantazopoulos 2013; 2016c), in a manner that returns us way back to the definitional 
“procrustean dilemma” that was discussed in the famous LSE conference on populism 
of the late-1960s (Ionescu & Gellner 1969). 
 
Obviously, an Essex School stress on discursive articulation predisposes us to inquire 
on the structural location of populist signifiers within a particular discourse: for 
example, where is reference to “the people” located within a given discourse: does it 
function as the nodal point, as a central empty signifier? Or is it located at the 
periphery of the discursive structure under examination, relegated to a mere moment 
                                                        
5 The aforementioned study does not include the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn, which, we can assume, 
would have probably taken an even less tolerant position compared to ANEL. 
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in a wider discursive articulation? Moreover, and crucially for our endeavour here, the 
discursive perspective urges us to research the historical preconditions of every 
articulation within a given context, highlighting the distinctiveness of every project; 
in other words, highlighting the historically-specific and context-related features of 
the various populist experiences. 
 
On these premises we set out to problematize the relationship between populism and 
nationalism, and thus between the signifiers “people” and “nation”, in the context of 
the Greek case. We began with the paradoxical juxtaposition between “nation” and 
“people” established during the post-War era by the ruling right-wing camp, stressing 
the implications of a regime that excluded from the national community a significant 
part of the population. We proceeded with an analysis of the populist discourse of the 
early PASOK in the 1970s and 1980s, within which the “nation” was reclaimed by the 
left, with populism overdetermining its meaning. We then focused on sharply 
different and contradicting cases of populist mobilisation within contemporary 
Greece, in a context defined by the anti-populist and “technocratic” turn of PASOK 
under Simitis, examining religious and extreme-right populism, as exemplified in the 
cases of Archbishop Christodoulos and LAOS. Moving on with our “genealogy”, we 
highlighted the distinctive ideological traits of SYRIZA’s inclusionary populism and 
the party’s uneasy symbiosis with the national-populist ANEL.  
 
What can we make out of this extreme variability of the nationalism/populism nexus 
within the context of a small country like Greece? In an effort to theorise our 
empirical findings, two options seem to open themselves: the relationship between 
nationalism and populism can either be one of contingent articulation or one of a 
necessary, reductive fusion. Yet, only the first orientation can effectively account for 
the paradoxes of historical experience. Here, as we tried to show, Greece presents a 
hugely significant case, due to the vast multiplicity of antithetical articulations 
between populism and nationalism within a (historically speaking) rather short period 
of time. While stressing how strongly populism operates in tandem with nationalism, 
our analysis has highlighted the extremely different forms this mutual engagement 
can take, with each instance requiring careful treatment within a rigorous theoretical 
framework that can accommodate and critically interpret such heterogeneities.  
 
The observed differences in the articulation of populism with nationalism have 
important consequences. It is possible to have country-wide divisions along a “nation 
vs. the people” axis as post-war Greece demonstrates; a distancing re-emerging in a 
very different strategic form with Varoufakis’ DiEM25. In some cases, a specific 
notion of “the people” within a nationalist discursive framework foregrounds the 
emergence of a populist strategy (as is the case, for example, with Christodoulos), 
while in others “the nation” very gradually enters the repertoire of a populist 
discourse due to the political and historical context, without crucially influencing the 
priorities of a given populist discourse (as has been the case with SYRIZA). Indeed, 
recent history along with the current conjuncture also provide many instances in 
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which political antagonism leads to the ideological articulation of “people” and 
“nation” in opposite camps or radically transforms their meaning. Here, international 
examples would include the Socialist Party’s inclusionary populism against Geert 
Wilders’ exclusionary nativist-populism in the Netherlands or the pluralist and 
tolerant “people” of Bernie Sanders against the homogeneous and intolerant “nation” 
of Donald Trump. In that sense, and although the relations between nationalism and 
populism do call for further exploration, our thesis is that, in both theoretical and 
historical terms, the relation between the nation and the people is context-dependent 
and historically-specific, and does not obey any predetermined reductionist or 
essentialist logic of fusion. 
 
At any rate, further research is definitely needed if the relation between populism and 
nationalism is to be adequately theorised and clarified. This research should take into 
account various historical conjunctures in which the “people” and the “nation” 
represented separated or even opposite camps, while it should also inquire into the 
variations of the close articulation between the two in different geographical and 
socio-political contexts. The empirical and comparative part of our paper, focusing on 
the Greek experience, is moving exactly in this direction, positioning Greek populism 
firmly within its historicity and variability, offering some preliminary conclusions that 
could be tested in further comparative research. If the relation between the two modes 
of identification tends to vary so much within a given national context within a time-
span of five decades, one can only imagine the variability and contradictions that 
comparativists will encounter when engaging with research on a global scale. 
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